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ELD-005        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-3248 
___________ 
 
MATTHEW JONES, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
RUTH ANN MINNER; TREASURER JACK MARKELL; LIEUTENANT JOHN 
CARNEY; OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil No. 1:17-cv-01837) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect, 
Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 4, 2019 
Before:  GREENAWAY, Jr., KRAUSE, and PORTER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  February 8, 2019) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Matthew Jones appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his 
complaint.  Because the appeal lacks arguable merit as a matter of law, we will dismiss it 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).    
In June 2017, Jones filed a civil rights complaint in the District of Delaware.1  The 
complaint raised myriad allegations of rape, murder, and kidnapping by the police and 
psychiatric treatment centers in Delaware.  But the complaint named only the Office of 
the Governor of the State of Delaware and three Delaware politicians:  Ruth Ann Minner, 
Jack Markell, and John Carney.  As to those defendants, Jones alleged that they stole his 
identity and “shut [him] up to die in their mental health facilities and … in their prison.”  
He also claimed that Governor Markell denied his pardon request in 2016.  Citing 
numerous constitutional amendments and federal criminal laws, Jones requested two 
billion dollars in damages.  
The District Court granted Jones’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, but 
dismissed the complaint without prejudice under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), holding that the 
“allegations … are legally and factually frivolous.”  In particular, the District Court 
concluded that the Delaware Governor’s Office was not a “person” subject to liability 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that any claims accruing before June 2015 were time-barred, that 
Jones lacked standing to bring claims under federal criminal laws, and that many of the 
                                              
1 The complaint was originally filed in the Eastern District of New York, which 
transferred the matter to the District of Delaware.   
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allegations were “fantastic and delusional.”2  Although the District Court provided Jones 
with 30 days to file an amended complaint against additional defendants, he failed to do 
so.  Instead, Jones appealed. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.3  Because we granted Jones 
leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we must screen this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous.  An appeal is 
frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”  Neitzke v. Williams, 
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).  Our review confirms that there is no arguable basis to 
challenge the District Court’s decision. 
As the District Court noted, the Delaware Governor’s Office, a state agency, is not 
a “person” capable of being sued under § 1983.  See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 
491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989).  Furthermore, Eleventh Amendment immunity bars claims for 
damages against the three individual defendants insofar as they were named in their 
official capacities as Governor.  See Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1990).  
There is also no basis to grant relief on Jones’ bare bones assertion that Governor Markell 
                                              
2 The “fantastic and delusional” claims are, for the most part, unrelated to the named 
defendants.     
 
3 Although the District Court dismissed Jones’ complaint without prejudice, he has, 
through the filing of a notice of appeal within 30 days of the dismissal, indicated his 
intent to stand on the complaint.   Therefore, the appeal will not be dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction.  See Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976); Batoff 
v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992) (order becomes final where 
plaintiff given 30 days to amend complaint, but instead files notice of appeal within that 
time).  
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denied his pardon request.  See Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 
464 (1981) (“pardon and commutation decisions have not traditionally been the business 
of courts; as such, they are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judicial review.”); 
Arnold v. State, 49 A.3d 1180, 1182 (Del. 2012) (“The Delaware Pardon Process is a 
constitutionally created procedure giving the Governor the power to pardon an applicant 
unconditionally, conditionally, or not at all after receiving a recommendation by the 
Board of Pardons.”).  As to the other individual defendants, Jones failed to plead facts 
that, if proven, would show their personal involvement.  See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 
F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal 
involvement in the alleged wrongs.”).  In addition, because the statute of limitations for 
§ 1983 claims in Delaware is two years, any of Jones’ claims that accrued before June 
2015 are time-barred.  See McDowell v. Del. State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 190 (3d Cir. 
1996).  Finally, as a private citizen, Jones lacks standing to bring criminal charges against 
the defendants.  See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private 
citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of 
another.”).   
Because we conclude that this appeal is legally frivolous, we will dismiss it 
pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 
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